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Due Process Land Use 
Claims After Lingle 
J. Peter Byrne* 
The Supreme Court held in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. that 
challenges to the validity of land use regulations for failing to advance 
governmental interests must be brought under the Due Process Clause, 
rather than the Takings Clause, and must be evaluated under a 
deferential standard. This Article analyzes and evaluates the probable 
course of such judicial review, and concludes that federal courts will resist 
due process review of land use decisions for good reasons but not always 
with an adequate doctrinal explanation. However, state courts can use 
due process review to provide state level supervision of local land use 
decisions in the absence of other legislative or administrative checks on 
local discretion. Such judicial review should focus on decisions reflecting 
distortions in the local political process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional law of land use regulation was greatly clarified by 
the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Lingle v. Chevron US.A. Inc.! The 
Court made plain that the Takings Clause did not authorize courts to 
Copyright © 2007 by the Regents of the University of California. 
• Professor of Law. Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks go to John Echeverria 
for comments on an earlier draft and to Rebekah Viola and Edward Imperatore for research 
assistance. 
1. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
471 
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review the effectiveness or wisdom of such regulations, including the 
Hawaii statute capping gasoline station rents at issue in Lingle. Such 
judicial investigations must instead be conducted under the Due Process 
Clause. And in such cases, courts must defer, as some lower courts 
employing the Takings Clause had not, to legislative judgments of state 
and local governments. Most importantly, Lingle cut off any doctrinal 
path for heightened scrutiny of the validity of land use regulations in 
defense of property rights, reaffirming the necessity for judicial 
deference.2 
Despite its rejection of heightened scrutiny, the Court's unanimous 
decision returns attention to doctrine under the Due Process Clause. In 
his concurring opinion in Lingle, Justice Kennedy noted "today's decision 
does not foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be so arbitrary 
or irrational as to violate due process. The failure of a regulation to 
accomplish a stated or obvious objective would be relevant to that 
inquiry.,,3 He stated that in Lingle, because Chevron had not preserved its 
due process claim, the Court had no occasion to decide whether the 
Hawaii legislation "represents one of the rare instances in which even 
such a permissive standard has been violated."4 Kennedy's statement 
characteristically looks both ways, signaling that landowners have rights 
under the Due Process Clause, but that the legal standard is "permissive" 
to government and that success by owners will be "rare." 
How likely is it that landowners will be able to prevail against local 
governments on substantive due process claims challenging land use 
decisions? In federal court, the answer will-and should-be virtually 
never. In some state courts, the owner's prospects are much better, but in 
many others the chances are no better than in federal court. Moreover, 
the odds of success in most fora seem to be growing longer, as courts 
develop new doctrines to bar or defeat such claims. Some exceptions to 
this trend may indicate that due process claims can perform a salutary 
function in very limited circumstances. It may be time for those who think 
that due process review can serve useful functions to look to statutory 
reform. 
Part I of this Article reviews the federal constitutional framework for 
due process review of land use decisions and examines additional hurdles 
that lower federal courts have designed to discourage such cases. Part II 
examines state due process land use cases in light of the special role state 
courts play in overseeing local land use decisions. I argue that state court 
due process review is especially appropriate to correct local political 
distortions. 
2. Id at 545. 
3. Id at 54~9 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
4. Id at 549 (quoting Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 550 (1998». 
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I. FEDERAL COURTS 
A. Doctrinal Framework 
Venerable Supreme Court precedent indicates that federal courts 
will take seriously due process challenges to land use legislation and 
decisions. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the granddaddy of all 
zoning cases, rejected a facial due process challenge to zoning itself; the 
Court stated that land use legislation would be upheld unless it were 
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."s The Court's opinion 
has been seen as "progressive,,6 and even "an important charter for 
'social planning."'7 Yet the Court did not intend to allow zoning 
authorities to regulate uses without judicial supervision, expressly 
warning that when the zoning power would "come to be concretely 
applied to particular premises, including those of the appellee, or to 
particular conditions, or to be considered in connection with specific 
complaints, some of them, or even many of them, may be found to be 
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.,,8 
The Court, indeed, soon reached out to decide an as-applied due 
process challenge to the residential zoning of one owner's property in 
Nectow v. City of Cambridge.9 Ostensibly applying the Euclid standard, 
the Court relied on the finding of a special master that zoning the 
plaintiff's land residential rather than industrial did not promote the 
public welfare, and reversed the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court. The facts of the case involve setting a boundary between 
residential and industrial zones in the middle of a block rather than in the 
middle of a street. The Massachusetts court had considered the case 
thoughtfully and in detail, stressing that "there would be great difficulty 
in pronouncing a scheme for zoning unreasonable and capricious because 
it embraced land on both sides of the same street in one district instead of 
making the center of the street the dividing line."10 This view seems 
5. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
6. Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive 
Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2158 (2002). 
7. Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court 
Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1544 (1998). Post shrewdly observed: "the social planning authorized 
by Euclidwas founded on Sutherland's appreciation of the systematic interdependence of urban 
land usages." Id. 
8. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. 
9. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
10. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 157 N.E. 618 (Mass. 1927), rev'd, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
The Massachusetts court plausibly argued, 
If there is to be zoning at all, the dividing line must be drawn somewhere. There 
cannot be a twilight zone .... In the nature of things, the location of the precise limits 
of the several districts demands the exercise of judgment and sagacity. There can be 
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entirely consistent with Euclids acceptance of overinclusiveness of 
zoning categories: 
The inclusion of a reasonable margin, to insure effective enforcement, 
will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity. Such 
laws may also find their justification in the fact that, in some fields, 
the bad fades into the good by such insensible degrees that the two 
are not capable of being readily distinguished and separated in terms 
of legislation. 11 
Though Euclid had addressed this problem only in the stance of a 
facial challenge, Nectow presented what might be said to involve only 
that ordinary amount of arbitrary line-drawing inherent in zoning.12 
Nectowis curt about the criteria applied, relying entirely on the finding of 
the special master that the public interest "will not be promoted" by the 
classification. \3 This conclusion is confusing, because the classification of 
Nectow's frontage as residential has obvious benefits for the residences 
located across the street, which otherwise would face industrial 
installations. While Nectowrestates the deferential standard of Euclid, its 
application seems demanding. Courts seeking to make sense of the two 
cases could take a wide range of approaches. 
The Supreme Court then stopped deciding land use cases until the 
1960s, during which time its general approach to substantive due process 
challenges not involving certain noneconomic "fundamental interests" 
became highly deferential to all forms of legislative judgments.14 The 
abandonment of due process review of economic legislation is one of the 
most important and discussed constitutional developments of the 
twentieth century. IS One need only say here that there continues today a 
broad consensus across a wide ideological spectrum that federal courts 
should not employ the Due Process Clause to evaluate the wisdom of 
economic regulation. This has eliminated the doctrinal foundation for 
no standard susceptible of mathematical exactness in its application. Opinions of the 
wise and good well may differ as to the place to put the separation between different 
districts. 
Jd. at 620. The court also noted that the land in question always had been used for residential 
purposes and could continue to be so. Jd. 
11. ViII. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926). 
12. There are hints in the report of the special master that Cambridge had zoned Nectow's 
frontage on Brookline Street residential to depress its value in anticipation of condemning it to 
widen the street. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 186-87. Had Nectow shown that the city zoned his land to 
depress its own anticipated compensation payments, he would have had a clearer due process 
claim based on the self-interest of the regulatory authority. See JULIAN CONRAD 
JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LA W 58-59 
(1998). 
13. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188. 
14. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
15. See, e.g., Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An 
Exhumation and Burial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34. 
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due process review of zoning in federal courts. Justice O'Connor's 
conclusion for the unanimous court in Lingle makes this abundantly 
clear: "The reasons for deference to legislative judgments about the need 
for, and likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well-
established, and we think they are no less applicable here.,,16 Lingle 
actually may be more important for reemphasizing the need for federal 
deference to zoning judgments than in rejecting the Takings Clause as a 
textual basis for review. 
Justice Kennedy's slight distancing from the Court's reaffirmation of 
deference in Lingle marks his distinctive comfort with some less 
constrained due process review. His separate opinion in Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel represents perhaps the only instance of a 
contemporary Justice arguing to strike down federal economic legislation 
as a violation of due process.17 Moreover, his important opinion for the 
Court in Lawrence v. Texas,18 invalidating state sodomy laws, eschewed 
the familiar distinction between "fundamental" and all other interests 
that has served to cabin the occasions for judicial formulation of 
substantive constitutional restraints under the Due Process Clause.19 
In the lower federal courts, judges lately have been adamant in the 
repugnance they feel toward entertaining due process land use claims. 
Judge Posner's rhetoric had become widely quoted: "No one thinks 
substantive due process should be interpreted so broadly as to protect 
landowners against erroneous zoning decisions. ,,20 He characterized the 
case before him as a "masquerade" in that it was a "garden-variety 
zoning dispute dressed up in the trappings of constitutional law.,,21 His 
concern seems to be that such cases involve common, multitudinous, and 
trivial disputes that should be and probably are dealt with by state law. A 
recent student commentator noted with understatement that Posner's 
statements indicate, "the Seventh Circuit would perhaps prefer not to 
hear these disputes at all.',zz 
Beyond adhering to the "permissive" standard of Euclid, federal 
courts have made two doctrinal moves to discourage due process land use 
16. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005). 
17. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 550 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that a federal statute retroactively requiring employers to provide 
medical benefits to miners violates due process). In Apfel, four Justices argued that the act was 
unconstitutional but relied on the Takings Clause; four agreed that it should be analyzed only 
under the Due Process Clause but concluded it was valid. 
18. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
19. Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21. 
20. Coniston Corp. v. ViII. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1988). 
21. Id at 467. 
22. Parna A. Mehrbani, Comment, Substantive Due Process Claims in the Land-Use 
Context: The Need for a Simple and Intelligent Standard of Review, 35 ENVTL. L. 209, 231 
(2005). 
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cases. First, some circuits have raised the bar for what constitutes a 
protected property interest. Second, federal courts generally have applied 
an even more permissive standard than merely "arbitrary and 
unreasonable." 
B. The Emergence of Entitlement Requirements 
The Due Process Clause applies only when government action 
deprives someone of a liberty or property interest. If the government 
action does not deprive someone of such an interest, there is no inquiry 
whether or not the action is arbitrary. One might have thought that this 
preliminary inquiry would be easily met in land use cases, since the 
complaint is about restricting the use an owner may make of her land. 
And, indeed, the Supreme Court did not question this in either Euclid or 
Nectow. Nonetheless, several courts have adopted doctrine from a long 
line of procedural due process cases, essentially dealing with rights in 
bureaucratic decision making, to raise the bar for what constitutes a 
protected property interest?3 These courts require that the owner have a 
legal "entitlement" to the permit they are seeking, rather than just own 
the land affected.24 A federal district court recently described when an 
owner has a property interest in a permit: "[A] valid property interest 
exists when a municipality has no discretion in the grant or denial of a 
permit for proposed land use. This occurs, for instance, when an applicant 
seeks a permit conditioned only on compliance with certain 
ordinances. "25 
The rationale behind the entitlement requirement is that landowners 
are being deprived of permission to make a certain use of the land, not of 
the land itself. Plaintiffs must show that they have a clear right to the 
permit and that official decision makers had no discretion to deny that 
right. The effect of such a rule is that usually plaintiffs can attack only 
revocation of permits already granted, retroactive legislation, or purely 
ministerial acts. As such, the entitlement requirement is surely 
inconsistent with Euclid and Nectow, which welcomed facial and as-
applied due process challenges to discretionary land use decisions. 
Indeed, it is inconsistent with the very idea of substantive due process, 
which authorizes judicial limits on legislative judgments, which will 
always be discretionary. Whatever sense the "property interest" barrier 
may make in procedural due process cases, in which a harmed owner 
23. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
24. See, e.g., Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key, 17 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 1994); Biser 
v. Town of Bel Air, 991 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1993); Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 
(2d Cir. 1985). 
25. Minnetonka Moorings, Inc. v. City of Sherwood, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1251,1257 (D. Minn. 
2005) (citations omitted). 
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claims that specific agency action requires an individualized hearing, it 
makes little sense applied to legislative or policy judgments challenged as 
outside the police power.26 Although this doctrine seems inconsistent with 
Supreme Court precedent and has been convincingly assailed by 
Professor Mandelker,27 it has spread and does express loudly the effort by 
federal courts to avoid due process review of discretionary land use 
decisions. 
C Heightened Standards of Review 
Most federal courts have adopted standards of review even more 
deferential to zoning officials than arbitrary and unreasonable. In a 
much-discussed decision written by then Judge Alito, the Third Circuit 
held that the plaintiff must show that the zoning official's action "shocked 
the conscience" of the court, and did not just reflect an "improper 
motive."28 The Supreme Court uses this standard in cases of alleged 
police misconduct, such as injuring bystanders in conducting high-speed 
chases of suspects.29 While it is not yet clear what kinds of zoning 
decisions can shock the judicial conscience, it plainly implies something 
other than mere failure to reasonably advance a legitimate interest; 
something venal or invidious must be seen. The First Circuit has said that 
it permits federal relief only in "truly horrendous situations."3o 
Other circuits have phrased the higher standard differently.3! The 
Eight Circuit requires that the zoning action be "truly irrational" such as 
deciding based on the first letter of the applicant's name or by flipping a 
coinY The D.C. Circuit requires "grave unfairness.'>33 The Seventh 
26. John Hart Ely assailed the entitlement requirement in procedural due process as "a 
disaster, in both practical and theoretical terms." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 19 (1980). A less formalistic, reinvigorated 
procedural due process jurisprudence could help address troubling procedural failures in land 
use that currently are stuffed awkwardly into substantive doctrines. See City of Monterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (finding that continually shifting requirements for approval of 
site plan was a regulatory taking). 
27. Daniel R. Mandelker, Entitlement to Substantive Due Process: Old versus New 
Property in Land Use Regulation, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 61 (2000). 
28. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 
2003); see also Balin v. Twp. of Radnor, 151 F.App'x 31 (3d CiT. 2006) (unpublished summary 
order). 
29. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
30. Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 1992). 
31. Cases are helpfully collected in the Ellickson and Been casebook on land use controls. 
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
98-104 (2005). 
32. Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th CiT. 1992). In a 
recent decision, the Eighth Circuit put several strands together, stating that to be found to 
violate due process, a regulation must be '''truly irrational ... something more than ... arbitrary, 
capricious, or in violation of state law.' The action must therefore be so egregious or 
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Circuit requires the owner to show that the zoning decision not only is 
arbitrary, but that it violates another constitutional right or that state law 
does not provide an adequate remedy.34 The Fourth Circuit requires "no 
conceivable rational relationship.,,35 A recent study aptly found due 
process land use challenges to be those least likely to succeed.36 
In the rare cases where federal courts in the modem era have used 
substantive due process to invalidate land use decisions, there is a sense 
that the courts detect motives that threaten fundamental interests. In 
Marks v. City of Chesapeake, for example, the Fourth Circuit found a 
violation of due process in the city's denial of a conditional use permit to 
a palmistry business because the council's decision was "impermissibly 
tainted by 'irrational neighborhood pressure' manifestly founded in 
religious prejudice."37 The court's analysis sifts through the legitimate 
purposes asserted by the city's counsel, such as protecting overall 
property values, and finds them either expressly disclaimed by decision 
makers or having no plausible connection with the decision, leaving the 
impermissible purpose as the only probable one.38 This analysis conforms 
to that followed by the Supreme Court in finding that a city ordinance 
requiring a group home for the mentally disabled to obtain a special use 
permit violated the Equal Protection Clause; the stripping away of 
implausible asserted objectives revealed "an irrational prejudice against 
the mentally retarded. ,,39 In such cases, courts disapprove of grounds for a 
extraordinary as to shock the conscience." Koscielski v. City of Minneapolis, 435 F.3d 898, 902 
(8th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
33. George Washington Univ. v. Dist. of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
34. See New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. ViII. of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
35. Sylvania Dev. Corp. v. Calvert, 48 F.3d 810, 827 (4th Cir. 1995). 
36. loseph D. Richards & Alyssa A. Ruge, Most Unlikely to Succeed; Substantive Due 
Process Claims Against Local Government Applying Land Usc Restrictions, FLA. B.l., Apr. 
2004, at 34. 
37. Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 1989). The Fourth Circuit now 
follows the "entitlement" approach described above, see supra Part I.B., which might preclude 
reaching the merits of the Marks case. See DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & 
THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE 403 (2004). 
38. lohn Hart Ely has explained why laws enacted for an unconstitutional purpose violate 
due process: 
It is inconsistent with constitutional norms to select people for unusual deprivation on 
the basis of race, religion, or politics, or even simply because the official doing the 
choosing doesn't like them. When such a principle of selection has been employed, the 
system has malfunctioned: indeed we can accurately label such a selection a denial of 
due process. 
ELY, supra note 26, at 137. 
39. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). Cass Sunstein 
characterizes the few equal protection cases, like Cleburne, that invalidate laws despite applying 
an ostensible rational basis analysis as exceptions "when prejudice and hostility are especially 
likely to be present." Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Forword' Leaving 
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decision, but resist declaring a "fundamental interest" or "suspect 
classification," preferring narrower, more fact-bound judgments. Thus, 
they can nudge cities away from certain grounds for land use decisions 
without laying down broad rights that may cut too broad a swath in other 
contexts. 
Federal judicial resistance to due process land use cases may even 
grow in light of a recent Supreme Court decision. In City of Cuyahoga 
FaIls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, the Court rejected a 
developer's claim that the city's failure to award it permits to build low-
income housing violated due process.40 The permits were delayed due to a 
citizen petition authorized by the city charter. The Court held that the 
city's "refusal to issue the permits while the petition was pending in no 
sense constituted egregious or arbitrary government conduct.,,41 The 
Court cited County of Sacramento v. Lewis, which adopted the "shocks 
the conscience" test.42 It quoted County of Sacramento's observation that 
"only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in 
the constitutional sense. ",43 Although the Court did not explicitly 
embrace it, Cuyahoga will be read to confirm the Court's preference for 
the "shocks the conscience" approach in land use cases.44 Moreover, 
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion arguing that substantive due 
process should never be available for claims involving "nonfundamental" 
interests.45 While his opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, is somewhat 
Delphic, it certainly supports the impetus not to consider due process 
land use cases.46 Cuyahoga suggests that the Supreme Court is 
sympathetic to the lower federal courts' aversion to substantive due 
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 (1995). Much the same can be said of Marks. See 
supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
40. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003). 
41. Id at 198. 
42. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). The phrase originated in 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952), where the Court found that police pumping of 
a suspect's stomach violated due process. 
43. Cuyahoga, 538 U.S. at 198 (citing County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 846). 
44. County of Sacramento and prior cases had employed "shocks the conscience" to 
evaluate executive conduct. See County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 846. Cuyahoga provides a 
link for that standard to land use decisions, which often are a mix of legislative, executive, and 
adjudicative powers. 
45. Cuyahoga, 538 U.S. at 200 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
46. Id Interestingly, Justice Scalia suggested that concerns about arbitrary land use 
decisions be addressed under the Equal Protection Clause, where there is no requirement for 
showing deprivation of a property interest, only unequal treatment. See ViiI. of Willowbrook v. 
Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). It is not at all clear, however, that shifting to equal protection makes, 
or should make, much difference. Judge Frank Coffin has written, "[I]n the field of local permits, 
the nature of the Government conduct (or misconduct) required to establish either a substantive 
due process or equal protection claim is so similar as to compress the inquiries into one." Bake v. 
Coxe, 230 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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process land use cases, notwithstanding the possibilities left open in 
Lingle. 
But does not Lingle itself suggest vitality for vigorous land use 
challenges under the Due Process Clause by indicating that challenges to 
the validity of regulations must be brought under it instead of under the 
Takings Clause? Obviously, Justice Kennedy's concurrence, discussed 
above, does hold out some such hope. But there is precious little in the 
Court's opinion to encourage federal judges to overcome their aversion. 
Property rights activists had sought for years to persuade courts to 
employ heightened scrutiny on regulation of land development analogous 
to that employed for regulatory limitations on First Amendment rights; 
the Takings Clause was merely a doctrinal shift to encourage greater 
activism.47 But Lingle emphatically rejected any heightened scrutiny for 
property regulation warning that it would lead to evaluation of a "vast 
array" of statutes and ordinances and force courts to "substitute their 
predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert 
agencies.,,48 The Court described the proceedings in the case before it as 
"remarkable, to say the least," where the district court had ruled for the 
property owner on the ground that its expert's prediction that the statute 
would not achieve its purpose was "more persuasive" than the state's 
expert testimony.49 The Court concluded that the reasons for deference 
were "well established" and entirely applicable to land use regulations. 
Lingle not only removes the Takings Clause as a justification for 
heightened scrutiny of limits on property use, it precludes any other 
ground and insists on deference. 
II. STATE COURTS 
A. Structural Role of State Courts 
State courts have a far more intimate relation to the land use 
regulation process than do federal courts. They routinely decide cases 
involving interpretation of state and local land use laws, and apply several 
state law doctrines to oversee the administrations of these systems. They 
developed approaches to substantive due process review in the decades 
after Euclidwhen the Supreme Court ignored land use litigation. In most 
states, the courts are the only state officials who review local land use 
decisions, so that only they can effect any case-specific correction for 
oppression of owners or neighbors, or for exporting costs to other 
47. See R.S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation That Fails to Substantially 
Advance Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REv. 353 (2004). 
48. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005). 
49. Id at 545. 
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localities. We should think of state court substantive due process review 
as a judge-made form of state-level supervision of local law. Because of 
this supervisory role, restrictions placed on due process land use cases at 
the federal level are unlikely to be mirrored in state courts. State due 
process review needs to be refined as a form of state common law, not 
precluded by federal decisions. 
The states exhibit a wide disparity in the level of deference they 
afford land use actions challenged under due process. Some courts are 
highly deferential, perhaps to the same extent as federal courts.50 Others 
engage in more searching review, even up to overt second guessing of the 
efficiency or fairness of local choices.51 Most states fall on a continuum 
between these extremes.52 
In most states, constitutional judicial review of local land use 
decisions performs an essential function and cannot be dispensed with 
until a better substitute is found. Land use represents the most significant 
regulatory power exercised by local governments, allowing them to 
enhance or wipe out significant economic value, ecological functions, and 
community identity. Local governments perform this function generally 
in a parochial but inclusive political process, often combining intense 
economic interests with great popular passion. The open-ended, political 
character of land use regulation has increased as legislative amendments 
to zoning ordinances and discretionary site reviews have replaced 
traditional Euclidean zoning as the core land use activity. This intense 
activity goes on with little or no supervision from the state government 
nor responsibility to regional interests.53 The state government delegates 
the zoning power to the municipality, but in most states it then fails to 
provide expertise, coordination, or supervision. The only statewide 
officials performing any supervisory function on local land use decisions 
are the courts. 
The great vagaries of due process offer courts a residual 
constitutional justification to invalidate local measures seen to exceed 
tolerable fairness or efficiency. Courts also sometimes rely on state 
enabling acts, which provide another basis for requiring that ordinances 
advance the public welfare.54 In either case, the main inquiry is whether a 
50. E.g., Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976). 
51. E.g., La Salle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 145 N.E. 2d 65 (Ill. 1960). The extreme 
intrusiveness of judicial review in Illinois is extensively considered in Fred P. Bosselman, The 
Commodification of "Nature's Metropolis':' The Historical Context Of Illinois' Unique Zoning 
Standards, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527 (1992). 
52. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 31, at 110. 
53. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self.Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored 
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.1. 1985 (2000); Richard 
Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990). 
54. The first section of the 1926 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) provides 
specific powers "[f]or the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of 
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reviewing court can discern a plausible way that the ordinance advances 
the public interest.55 
Judicial review of the public interest does not necessarily entail 
courts setting land use policy or second-guessing legislative judgments; 
formally, the state legislative choice has been to leave these judgments 
primarily to the local elected officials. But the state courts have been 
crucial in developing doctrines to oversee the exercise of these powers 
and to adjust to new regulatory devices. These judicial doctrines have not 
been technical or clear-edged but rather vague and adaptable. Norman 
Williams memorably described planning law as "stomach jurisprudence,,56 
where judicial attitudes play large roles and a kind of judicial policy is 
developed: "In general 'judicial policy' refers to interpretation of the 
broad constitutional guarantees as applied to specific problems involved 
in land use conflicts; but realistically it must be recognized that such 
decisions often overlap with what might appropriately be the subject 
matter of legislative policy.,,57 While state legislatures can modify many of 
these judicial doctrines or roles, it is most striking how rarely they have.58 
the community." U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Advisory Comm. on Zoning, A Standard State 
Zoning Enabling Act, § 1 (1924, reprinted 1926), available at http://www.planning.org/ 
growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926 .pdf. 
55. In Southern BurJjngton County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, Justice Hall 
treated constitutional and enabling standards largely as interchangeable: 
It is elementary theory that all police power enactments, no matter at what level of 
government, must conform to the basic state constitutional requirements of 
substantive due process and equal protection of the laws. These are inherent in 
[Article I, part 1 of New Jersey's] Constitution, the requirements of which may be 
more demanding than those of the federal Constitution. It is required that, 
affirmatively, a zoning regulation, like any police power enactment, must promote 
public health, safety, morals or the general welfare. (The last term seems broad 
enough to encompass the others.) Conversely, a zoning enactment which is contrary to 
the general welfare is invalid. Indeed these considerations are specifically set forth in 
the zoning enabling act as among the various purposes of zoning for which regulations 
must be designed. Their inclusion therein really adds little; the same requirement 
would exist even if they were omitted. If a zoning regulation violates the enabling act 
in this respect, it is also theoretically invalid under the state constitution. We say 
'theoretically' because, as a matter of policy, we do not treat the validity of most land 
use ordinance provisions as involving matters of constitutional dimension; that 
classification is confined to major questions of fundamental import. 
336 A.2d 713, 725 (N.J. 1975) (citations omitted). 
56. NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW: 
LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 4:1 (2003). 
57. /d. at 69. 
58. A notable example is Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 
(N.J. 1986), which upheld New Jersey's Fair Housing Act despite the Act's substantial 
displacement of the New Jersey court's elaborate approach to vindicating the Mount Laurel 
constitutional disapproval of exclusionary zoning. See J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs 
Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265, 2279-80 (1997). 
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State courts are far better locations to conduct this judicial oversight 
than federal courts.59 Local government and land use law is state statutory 
or administrative law. Property rights primarily are established and their 
contents defined by state law. All due process claims come embedded in 
these state and local laws. State judges not only understand these laws 
better than federal judges, they must interpret them to make sense of the 
constitutional claim.60 State courts often can address apparent injustices 
or inefficiencies more readily in construing local ordinances, state statues, 
or common law doctrines than in the blunderbuss of due process 
invalidation. State constitutional doctrine has branched into rules 
inseparable from land use law and policy, and often has a character 
distinct to that state. Finally, state judges inevitably hear far more land 
use cases than do federal judges. 
The normative core of substantive due process, in the absence of 
unenumerated rights, hardly implicates a well-understood federal 
interest. As noted above, economic due process claims generally 
disappeared from federal dockets seventy years ago and federal courts 
stoutly resist them in the land use context. Federal due process extends 
only the vaguest protections to what chiefly are state property rights. No 
express federal constitutional provisions usually are implicated, unlike, 
for example, first amendment claims concerning local signage or "adult" 
motion picture theater ordinances.61 Federal courts disclaimed 
responsibility for alleged wrongs in land use cases that might have been 
thought to be of special federal significance, such as widespread racial 
segregation in housingY Rather than federal interests, due process claims 
invoke troubling departures from normal political practices, which 
themselves may be quite complex and messy. Thus courts must evaluate 
whether something unusual has occurred, which requires good knowledge 
of ordinary practice, and whether invalidation here will improve overall 
fairness and efficiency. This seems much more like supervision of a 
lurching local political system than vindication of distinct rights within a 
fully articulated federal constitutional system. 
59. Scholars have argued for a similar precedence for state courts in regulatory takings cases. See 
Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE LJ. 203 
(2004); Carol M Rose, What Federalism Tells Us about Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=98l205. 
60. Indeed, a frequent claim made to bolster a federal due process claim is that an action 
violates state law; in such cases it often will seem easier and more direct simply to adjudicate the 
claim under state law. 
61. See. e.g., City of Ladue v. GiIleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (finding that city ordinance 
prohibiting homeowners from displaying signs on their property violates the First Amendment); 
City of Renton v. Playtimes Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding zoning ordinance for 
"adult" theatres and elaborating First Amendment standards for such regulations). 
62. See ViiI. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) 
(determining that plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 
(1975) (holding that nonresidents lack standing). 
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Are state courts likely to change their approaches to due process 
review as a result of federal developments? Might some, for example, 
adopt the "shocks the conscience" approach? The latter seems unlikely; it 
is not reflected in state cases decided since 1998 and state standards seem 
well settled under state precedents.63 On the other hand, there seems to 
be some movement toward adopting the restrictive notion of a protected 
property interest. In Kittery Retail Ventures v. Town of Kittery, the 
Maine Supreme Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to 
new development limits in part because it concluded that the developer 
lacked a protected interest in the permit he sought.64 However, given the 
important oversight role of state courts in the land use context, one 
suspects that if this federal approach to protected property interests takes 
root, some other basis will be found for courts to supervise local land use 
decisions, such as equal protection or construction of the state zoning 
enabling act. 
If due process review persists in state courts, what should be its 
content? Historically, state court due process review of zoning decisions 
has predominately protected individual property owners from serious 
losses that do not seem justified by the public gain. Nectow-like cases 
relieved owners from costly regulations when courts doubted the public 
gain. Certainly, such decisions have dwindled in most states. One reason 
may be the availability of Takings Clause claims, which conspicuously 
advance such concerns. Through the regulatory takings approach in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, property owners can 
claim that an ordinance unfairly deprives them of too much value.65 
Significantly, the Penn Centraltest adjusts the severity of economic losses 
that must be compensated based upon "the character of the 
governmental action,"66 which has been interpreted to allow some limited 
weighing of the public benefits obtained.67 The availability of specific 
63. The court in Concept Properties, LLP v. City of Minnetrista, 694 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2005), did articulate a higher standard than irrationality for zoning cases. Judge Wright 
explained: "Even arbitrary governmental action or government decision-making lacking a 
factual basis will not support a substantive due process claim. Courts generally have found 
substantive due process claims available in zoning cases only when the conduct of the decision-
maker was motivated by personal or political animus." [d. at 824 (citations omitted). 
64. Kittery Retail Ventures, L.L.c. v. Town of Kittery, 856 A.2d 1183 (Me. 2004). 
65. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
66. [d. at 124. 
67. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). John Echeverria has waged a long battle to cabin the Penn Central test, in no small 
part because of the belief that this weighing of the importance or fit of the governmental 
measure belongs solely in due process. See John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 
23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 171, 189-92 (2005). 
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takings claims may make reliance on the vagaries of due process less 
attractive.68 
It will be interesting to see whether the stern disapproval of Lingle 
and the beckoning siren of Penn Central will lead the minority of state 
courts, such as in Illinois, that have maintained a robust tradition of 
demanding due process review to protect regulated property owners, to 
abandon it. What seems most likely it that the twin signals will seal the 
abandonment of such due process property protection in the vast 
majority of states that have retreated from it in the past decades except in 
the most egregious cases. 
B. Correcting Political Distortions 
Lingle's admonishment against interfering with democratic 
discretion raises the central question of what should be the primary 
function or concern of state due process review in the future. For many 
years, in a jurisprudence entwined with the protection of property 
owners, courts sought to define the scope of permissible legislative 
authority, the police power, to identify which purposes were illegitimate. 
State enabling acts seem to have sanctioned this task by tying the exercise 
of zoning authority to furtherance of broadly identified public values. But 
the goals of planning laws have grown to encompass a very wide range of 
cultural and environmental values, as well as the traditional and 
capacious health, safety, and welfare. A paradigmatic example is 
aesthetic regulation. Courts long invalidated regulations justified by 
aesthetic considerations alone, requiring some coupling with more 
traditional purposes such as safety.69 But today, promotion of beauty is 
accepted as a legitimate public purpose, subject only to some First 
Amendment limits.70 
But this does not mean that there are no limits on what goals a 
zoning body may pursue. The indispensable core of substantive due 
68. Courts may need to analyze constitutional claims that address loss to the property 
owner under the Takings Clause instead of the Due Process Clause. In a few decisions, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that claims that may be brought under explicit textual provisions of 
the constitution cannot be brought under the Due Process Clause. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386 (1989); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (plurality opinion). The Ninth Circuit 
subsequently held, on the strength of this precedent, that "substantially advance" claims must be 
brought under the Takings Clause rather than the Due Process Clause. Armendariz v. Penman, 
75 F.3d 1311, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1996). While Lingle certainly rejected the conclusion that the 
Ninth Circuit had drawn, the lower court's error was its premise that such claims may be brought 
under the Takings Clause at all. See, e.g., S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. City of Hayward, No. C 
03-0891, slip op. at 10-11, 2006 WL 3365598 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2006). It may well be that those 
due process claims that have emphasized the loss to the owner not only may be brought under 
Penn Centralbut mustbe under the doctrine of Graham and Albright. 
69. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 559-61. 
70. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 29 (1954). 
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process is that legislation must serve a public purpose. Legislation that 
secures benefits only for powerful or well-placed private entities and 
harms the public interest fails this test. Thus, in my view, due process 
here imposes the same limitations on regulatory power that the Public 
Use Clause imposes on the power of eminent domain, and for the same 
reasons.71 The rationale for democratic control over land development is 
securing the common good. As in the case of eminent domain, however, 
the problem is to identify criteria that courts can use to identify 
circumstances where officials have succumbed to illegitimate pressures. 
And as in eminent domain, substantive criteria are unworkable, because 
they inevitably prohibit legitimate public goals and will fail to anticipate 
enough of the circumstances where the public interest may be abused.72 
Instead of attempting to identify substantive criteria for the 
legitimate exercise of police power, the most promising path for state due 
process review lies in subjecting to heightened scrutiny those local land 
use decisions most likely to be distorted by unequal participation in the 
political process.73 Zoning decisions may be distorted by the intensity of 
economic interest they pose to owners or neighbors, as opposed to the 
majority of local citizens, or by divergences of interest between a local 
community and the larger state or region.74 Local or state law can 
ameliorate these distortions by adopting procedures that generate 
information for and give voice to dispersed or unrepresented residents.75 
But when they do not, due process review may be the only check on the 
pursuit of narrow interests. 
State courts have developed distinct doctrines that help specify when 
the local political process might be suspect. Zoning actions that fall within 
these doctrines typically are not condemned categorically as violations of 
due process. Rather, they present circumstances in which a reviewing 
71. The Supreme Court essentially equated these provisions in Hawaii Housing Authority 
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), and in Berman, 348 U.S. 26. In Midkiff, the unanimous Court 
stated, "When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases 
make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than the wisdom of other 
kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal courts." Midkiff, 467 
U.S. at 242-43. 
72. See ROBERT G. DREHER & JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, KELdS UNANSWERED 
QUESTIONS: THE POLICY DEBATE OVER THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 40-42 (2006), available at 
hUp:llwww.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/currenCresearch/documents/GELPIReporCKelo.pdf; J. 
Peter Byrne, Condemnation of Low Income Residential Communities Under the Takings 
Clause, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 131,141 (2005). 
73. Cf Byrne, supra note 722, at 157-62 (advocating enhanced procedures to protect low-
income residents in eminent domain decisions). 
74. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as Problem of Local 
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 854-56 (1983). 
75. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative 
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use 
Decisions (pts. 1 & 2), 24 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 3, 269 (2005). 
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court exercises greater scrutiny of whether the measures advance the 
public interest. All involve some heightened concern about systematic 
unfairness in the local political process. For example, "spot zoning," the 
practice of amending a local zoning classification of a small parcel of 
property at the behest of the owner, comes under far more searching 
scrutiny than typical of other due process claims. The concern in these 
cases is a familiar public choice danger that a small class of owners may 
lobby intensely for the gain that can come from "upzoning" their land, 
thereby increasing its development value, but that diffuse neighbors, each 
of whom is injured only slightly, may be not assert their views.76 The 
judicial remedy that has evolved is a somewhat more demanding search 
for general public benefits from the amendment weighed against harm to 
the neighbors. However unsatisfactory anyone of these decisions may 
seem, the availability of such a claim in court likely deters egregious 
special favor actions that could occur without check in the absence of due 
process review. 
Other types of cases evoking greater due process scrutiny also 
involve concerns about political distortions, as when a municipality 
exports the costs of land use decisions to neighboring jurisdictions. These 
may be more significant than spot zoning because they implicate the 
interests of the state itself in securing the fair treatment of state residents 
who do not reside in the enacting locality. If continuing due process 
review of local zoning is justified by the absence of other state controls, 
then these cases are among the most significant. Reviewing state courts 
have long struggled with zoning enactments that impose substantial costs 
on neighboring jurisdictions. The EucHd Court held that, as far as federal 
constitutional law was concerned, each municipality so authorized by 
state law need consider only the local costs and benefits of a zoning 
ordinance. But state courts exercising due process review have sometimes 
invalidated measures that impose costs on state residents not represented 
in the local political process. Such measures can be as straightforward as 
placing a shopping center on a town's borders, so that much of the traffic 
must be borne by neighboring jurisdictions while the home jurisdiction 
76. At times there has been a formalistic debate about whether a zoning amendment of a 
small parcel is a "legislative" or "quasi-judicial" act. Compare Fasano v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973) (en banc) (quasi-judicial, enhanced scrutiny), with Arnel Dev. 
Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980) (legislative, deferential scrutiny). These 
debates really frame whether courts have a satisfactory doctrinal basis for increasing the level of 
scrutiny they apply in looking for public benefits. Findings that an amendment is quasi-judicial 
also has resulted in requirements of enhanced notice to affected parties and a more formal 
hearing process; these may find justification not in an essentialism about judicial process, but in 
addressing the legislative process problems that spawn special interest zoning. These or other 
adjustments may facilitate public participation in the decision-making process, leading to more 
acceptable outcomes. See generally Rose, supra note 744. 
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reaps the property tax benefits.77 In such a case, the town enacting the 
zoning must "give as much consideration" to the rights of residents of the 
adjoining town as to its own.78 
More complex external effects can also stimulate heightened review. 
Exclusionary zoning presents a case where rational, self-interested zoning 
by each community can isolate poor and minority populations to the 
detriment of the state or region. In Southern Burlington County NAACP 
v. Township of Mount Laurel, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck 
down exclusionary zoning practices.79 The crucial doctrinal move in Mt. 
Laurel was the court's conclusion that due process required that a 
municipality's ordinance advance the interests of the state as a whole, not 
just its own residents. 
[I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning power is a 
police power of the state and the local authority is acting only as a 
delegate of that power and is restricted in the same manner as is the 
state. So, when regulation does have a substantial external impact, the 
welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the particular 
municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and 
served .... 
It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing 
of all categories of people is certainly an absolute essential in 
promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use 
regulation. Further the universal and constant need for such housing 
is so important and of such broad public interest that the general 
welfare which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must 
consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be parochially 
confined to the claimed good of the particular municipality.80 
The Mt. Laurel court significantly raised the level of judicial oversight of 
residential zoning to combat exclusionary measures; other states have 
required consideration of a broader public interest, but have not raised 
the level of judicial scrutiny. For example, the California Supreme Court 
requires that anyone municipality's growth control ordinance creating 
effects beyond its boundaries must reasonably advance the interests of 
the affected region.8! 
77. See Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 104 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1954). 
78. Id at 445. The rationale for some heightened judicial scrutiny here resembles that in 
federal dormant commerce clause cases, where the Supreme Court has required that state or 
local laws that impose substantial costs on neighboring states be reasonable. 
79. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
80. Id at 726, 727-28. 
81. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 487-88 (Cal. 1976) 
(en banc). Some subsequent decisions in California took a more active role. Harold A. 
McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zoning Law, 22 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. 
REV. 623, 634-35 (1987). McDougall also considers judicial efforts in other states. Id at 631-33; 
see also Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991). 
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Courts can pursue more subtle means to promote a sensible sharing 
of regional costs and benefits. In the interesting case of Zuckerman v. 
Town of Hadley, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated a 
town ordinance setting an annual limit on building permits.82 The court 
held that the limit would impermissibly push the need to meet the 
inevitable demand for new homes in the region onto surrounding towns. 
The court indicated that it would reach a different conclusion about an 
annual limit adopted by a regional governance body for environmental 
reasons. In the latter case, costs presumably would be more fairly spread 
across the region and a public interest more evident. In a nearly 
contemporaneous decision, the court had upheld a town's permanent cap 
on building permits enacted through a regional commission on Cape Cod 
acting pursuant to state legislative authorization.83 The court emphasized 
that the cap was adopted through a body established to address issues of 
regional concern.84 The court's rulings create incentives for localities to 
support state authorization of additional regional bodies to collectively 
address regional land use issues, thereby lessening the need for 
supervision by courts. 
There are, of course, serious concerns about the extent to which 
courts can engender more broadly beneficial land use laws by wielding 
the blunt tool of constitutional invalidation. Scholars continue to debate 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of the New Jersey courts grappling with 
exclusionary zoning.85 Weaker efforts, such as California's Ljvermore 
requirement that municipalities consider extrajurisdictional effects, have 
done little. But it is hard to argue that courts should ignore 
extrajurisdictional effects when they are the only state officials with 
supervision of local zoning. Legislated statewide coordination of local 
land use decisions has proceeded only slightly despite the advantages it 
plainly offers. Some statewide authority needs to referee parochial 
decisions by localities, and judges exercising due process review have 
filled a structural gap, despite continuing questions about the legitimacy 
and efficacy of such efforts. 
Due process invalidation by the courts sometimes can lead to 
legislative responses creating more specific regulatory requirements, the 
legitimacy of which is beyond question. New Jersey's enactment of its 
82. Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley, 813 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 2004). 
83. Home Builders Ass'n of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 808 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 
2004). 
84. Zuckerman, 813 N.E. 2d at 849 n.17. The cap on Cape Cod protected an aquifer upon 
which the entire town lay. The need to protect groundwater provides a general public purpose 
for the cap, and the involvement of the regional body provides assurance of a fair allocation of 
burdens among the affected towns. 
85. See, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE AND 
AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political 
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994). 
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Fair Housing Act stands as a major legislative innovation that put the 
problem of exclusionary zoning on a statutory foundation implemented 
by an administrative agency. While the respective merits of New Jersey's 
judicial and administrative efforts continue to stimulate debate, the Mt. 
Laurelcourt's decisions pushed New Jersey to institutionalize an ongoing 
requirement to permit affordable housing in nearly every municipality in 
the state. 
When states specify statutory goals and requirements for localities, 
courts have less reason to wield substantive due process; rather they 
interpret and enforce statutes. The Massachusetts Low and Moderate 
Income Housing Statute, enacted in 1969, illustrates this point.86 The Act 
limits the authority of local governments to refuse to permit affordable 
housing projects, and transfers appeals of denials by local authorities to 
an administrative body, known as the Housing Appeals Committee, 
which can overturn local decisions and grant permits to the applicants.8? 
What is striking is the very limited role Massachusetts courts have played 
regarding exclusionary zoning since the Act was adopted. In Board of 
Appeals v. Housing Appeals Committee, the Supreme Judicial Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Act and ruled that courts must defer to 
judgments of the Housing Appeals Committee. Subsequent decisions 
have largely interpreted the meaning of the statute rather than reviewing 
its application.88 Debate has persisted about the efficacy and 
appropriateness of the Act in the state legislature and governor's office, 
but it has not engulfed the courts.89 
Similarly, Minnesota expanded the authority of the Metropolitan 
Council to require coordination in planning among local governments in 
the Twin Cites region. In City of Lake Elmo v. Metropolitan Council, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Council to require 
a municipality to modify its comprehensive plan, accept part of the 
regional growth, and connect to the regional sewer network.90 
The enactment of statewide criteria shifts the role of courts from due 
process review of local decisions to interpretation or application of state 
law.91 States that do not want courts using due process or other vague 
86. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 2-23 (2005). 
87. The Act is analyzed in greater detail in Sharon Perlman Krefetz, Symposium, The 
Impact and Evolution of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act: 
Thirty Year.s of Experience with a State Legislative Effort to Overcome Exclusionary Zoning, 22 
W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 381 (2001), and Paul K. Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in 
Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. 
L. REV. 535 (1992). 
88. See Stockman, supra note 877, at 553-54 & n.126. 
89. See Krefetz, supra note 877, at 399-415. 
90. City of Lake Elmo v. Metro. Council, 685 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2004). 
91. Interestingly, the exceptional judicial decision of this character, which has been 
severely criticized, narrowly construed the regional role in determining the need for affordable 
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provisions to invalidate local zoning should address statewide issues 
through specific legislation.92 This Article has reviewed a few instances 
where specific state legislation has addressed land use problems more 
directly and with greater legitimacy than due process decisions. In the 
meantime, state judges will continue to exercise some form of due 
process review, which while highly imperfect, provides a judge-made 
form of state-level review.93 
CONCLUSION 
Federal courts have neither the appetite nor the expertise to engage 
in detailed review of the validity or efficiency of local land use decisions. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has acted to restore and 
even enhance deference to such decisions in substantive due process 
doctrine. Nor is it surprising that lower federal courts have developed 
doctrines to discourage filing most such challenges and to permit their 
dismissal before trial. At the same time, one should not expect state 
courts to follow suit, because what formally is presented as substantive 
due process review by state courts may be better thought of as a state 
common law of land use planning that has developed in the absence of 
comprehensive state statutory reform. This Article has argued that such 
state court due process review should focus on circumstances where 
housing, gravely weakening the state's affordable housing act. See Christian Activities Council, 
Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231 (Conn. 1999); Terry J. Tondro, Connecticut's 
Affordable Housing Appeals Statute: After Ten Year.s of Hope, Why Only Middling Results? 23 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 115 (2001). 
92. Oregon created the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), an administrative body that 
has jurisdiction over local land use appeals. LUBA dispatches cases with efficiency and 
expertise; although appellate courts have jurisdiction over appeals from LUBA decisions, they 
are reversed less often than trial courts' land use decisions had been. See Hong N. Huynh, 
Comment, Administrative Forces in Oregon's Land Use Planning and Washington's Growth 
Management, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 115, 122 (1997); Robert L. Liberty, Oregon's 
Comprehensive Growth Management Program: An Implementation Review and Lessons for 
Other States, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,367 (1992). It is remarkable that no other 
state has created a similar agency. 
93. Professor Michael Asimov has argued that due process review is inappropriate for land 
use cases. Michael Asimov et aI., The Failure of Due Process in Local Land Use Proceedings: is 
the imperfect way of doing business good enough or should we radically reform it?, 29 ZONING 
& PLAN. L. REP., Jan. 2006, at 2. Although he makes many good points, his argument does not 
suggest to me that substantive due process review by state courts soon will end. First, his 
arguments largely center on procedural due process, and he makes much of the property 
prerequisite discussed above. See supra Part LB. His discussion of substantive due process is 
cursory, and he does not distinguish between the stances of federal and state courts. He plausibly 
argues that land use decisions are primarily discretionary and political, but it does not follow 
from this that substantive due process limits on the exercise of that discretion are incoherent. 
Substantive due process exists to cabin legislative discretion. He may well be right that land use 
law would function better if judges reviewed local land use decisions under a state statute setting 
substantive standards of fairness and efficiency. 
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significantly affected parties face structural obstacles to representation in 
the local land use body. 
